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The purpose of this article is to introduce what is traditionally known in France as the wine ﬁliere. The paper is divided into two parts.
First, we will introduce the theoretical approaches and the main research questions relating to the ‘ﬁliere analysis’, by combining older
references with the complementary approaches derived from more recent theoretical contributions. The ﬁliere analysis is based on three
main historical theoretical streams and on four complementary and more recent approaches: the innovation chains, the global value
chain (GVC), the theory of transaction costs and the marketing approach. In the second part of the paper, we will provide a general
overview of the wine ﬁliere and conduct an analysis of the main actors, grape growers, co-operatives, wine brokers, wine merchants and
clusters according to the research questions introduced previously.
& 2013 UniCeSV, University of Florence. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.
Keywords: Wine industry; Filiere; Market chain; Theoretical references; Industrial organization
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
The purpose of this article is to introduce what is
traditionally known, in Southern European countries, as
the wine filiere. The concept is often reﬂected by the term
‘market chain’ in Anglo-American literature. The current
presentation of this ‘chain’ involves depicting the actors in
graphic form through linkages with arrows symbolizing the
relationships operating between them. After a strong devel-
opment of this tool during the 1960s–1970s, in particular as a
result of a national industrial policy based on that approach,1
economists gradually distanced themselves from that refer-
ence. This may be attributed to the opening of new research13 UniCeSV, University of Florence. Production and hosting
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ts in July 2012 highlighted in the French press: ‘‘A plan to
obile filiere’’.avenues, criticism concerning the difﬁculties in deﬁning the
boundaries for these chains precisely and the lack of a
theoretical frame work, or even to the absence of a research
question justifying the representation.
It was therefore the agricultural and food sector which
most frequently adopted the fili ere approach and this still
applies today.
In order to show the utility and the richness of this
approach, we have divided this work into two parts. In the
ﬁrst part, we start by looking at the ‘origins’ through a focus
on the theoretical underpinnings of the ‘filiere’ approach
considered in two ways: ﬁrst, by recalling the theoretical
references historically dated and second, by showing how
recent contributions, even if produced outside the literature on
the wine industry, could provide a substantial contribution to
understanding the economics of this industry. Although not
designed to be exhaustive, the inclusion of this complementary
literature adds to the founding works to enrich the meso-
analysis literature. Therefore, in the ﬁrst part we deﬁne the
approach adopted to conduct the ‘filiere’ analysis which we
then apply in the second part. In short, this article intends to
redeﬁne a modern tool and to apply it to the upstream level of
the wine chain.by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
2Those theoretical contributions were generated outside and indepen-
dently of the filiere analysis. However, their dissemination across the wine
filiere by various authors made a strong contribution to the method.
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The filiere analysis is based on three main historical
theoretical streams and on four complementary and more
recent approaches.
2.1. The historical references
2.1.1. The circuit: Technical and liberal productivist
references
As previously pointed out by Lauret (1983), the ﬂow of
goods and their counterparts in kind or in currencies is as
old as economics. The term circuit was ﬁrst introduced by
Bois–Guillebert around 1700. The landowner spends his
rent buying his clothes made by the tailor. The ‘worker’ is
at the origin of the ‘circuit’. A graphic representation was
often used in fili ere studies and it was ﬁrst introduced in
the ‘input–output table’ as a means of providing a clear
view of the accounts. Adam Smith, in his chapter about the
division of labor, describes the filiere that leads to this
mechanism as simple as a pair of scissors: ‘the miner, the
builder of the furnace to melt down the mineral, coal
maker, the adjuster, the blacksmith, the cutler’.
This notion of ‘circuit’ is closely associated with engi-
neering sciences and thus to the technique as the means of
explaining how goods are manufactured. In agriculture,
the term ‘technical itinerary’ is often used to describe the
way the operations are interconnected.
2.1.2. The Marxist approach:Kautsky (1900)
The Marxist approach also considers the circuit, but it
stresses the relationships between producers and the down-
stream industries. One striking example of this chain is
based on the linkages established between Nestle´ and cattle
farmers: ‘180 Swiss towns lost their economic autonomy
and became subjects of the House of Nestle´’. The question
in terms of bargaining power among economic subjects
is clearly shown. This approach guides researches with
regard to market power, domination, the transfer of
productivity gains, the share of value added and prices.
Also, it is possible to include in this stream the applica-
tion to agriculture of the filiere analysis (Commodity Chain
Analysis, CCA; Commodity System Analysis, CSA) pro-
vided by William H. Friedland, Professor Emeritus in the
Department of Sociology at the University of California at
Santa Cruz, for his founding work on the mechanization of
the harvesting of tomatoes and Iceberg lettuce, in 1984. He
deﬁnes ﬁve components or subjects as part of the CSA: the
production practices in modern agriculture, professional
organizations, the supply of labor and implementation,
scientiﬁc and technical research and marketing and dis-
tribution beyond the farm gate.
2.1.3. Systemic analysis and the general theory
of the systems
The third reference to the filiere analysis is found in the
General Systems Theory (von BertaIanffy, 1950) and in thesystemic approach popularized in France by Yves Barel
(1971) and later by Joe¨l de Rosnay (1975). Systemic
analysis deﬁnes filieres as systems, a group of elements
interacting and hierarchized in various levels. Systems
analysis leads to an understanding of the diversity and
complexity of the real world and to an awareness of the
complementarities between the elements of the filiere. As
an outcome of other ﬁelds of implementation, this refer-
ence ignores, to some extent, the theoretical explanations
and the identiﬁcation of causalities in economics, facing a
certain degree of ignorance and even rejection by the
academic world.
In the General Systems Theory, Jean-Louis Lemoigne
(1977) underlines the systemic paradigm and what he
describes as a ‘‘new discourse on the method’’. These are
the new precepts which disconcert a lot of researchers as
they introduce speciﬁc characteristics such as the local, the
‘ad hoc’ and the inﬁnite. In short, it introduces a break-
down of reality according to the goals of the researcher
and the basic research question, the positioning of the
research object in relation to the whole, its interpretation
according to its behavior and the impossible independence
of the observer. Furthermore, the multiplication of the
works in a ﬁeld of research leads to a certain degree of
convergence and the stability of the representations held,
which will facilitate an initial synthesis for a given filiere.
In our ﬁeld of research, the reference to the work of Ray
Goldberg (1957), who deﬁned the ‘Agribusiness concept’,
remains essential reading. This concept is of utmost
importance to the major operators and the public autho-
rities concerned by a product. On the one hand is the ﬁrst
desire to control the relationships with suppliers and
customers while on the other hand we see the second
desire to plan, control and intervene in the industrial
sectors.
2.2. Renewal and improvements
Despite of the lack of interest by academic theoreticians,
filiere analysis beneﬁted from some more recent works
contributing to its improvement.2 Without exploring them
in too much detail, we will address four streams of research
which remain quite independent: the innovation chains, the
global value chain (GVC), the theory of transaction costs
and the marketing approach.
2.2.1. Innovation chains
The concept of innovation chains is an application of the
filiere approach within the General Systems Theory at a
second level of analysis. Basically, it involves connecting a
product linked to a filiere with a group of innovation chains
that contribute (systemic vision) to both the technology and
competition dynamics in the agricultural or industrial sector.
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the wine chain (Montaigne, 1992, 1996a,b). This approach
fully integrates innovation as an evolutionist approach in the
ﬁeld of Industrial Economics, featuring the dynamics of
technology as an endogenous variable in economics (Dosi
et al., 1988).
We deﬁned ‘innovation chain’ as a ‘group of ﬁrms and
public or private organizations participating in the process
of setting up technology, that is to say a solution for a
technological paradigm, in its technical and economic
appraisal within the companies concerned and therefore
in the deﬁnition of a technological trajectory as a group of
technological trajectories of the basic ﬁrms.’
The concept enables the deﬁnition of a relevant observa-
tion ﬁeld in a case study applied to a particular ﬁeld. It
justiﬁes the economist studying technology as an intrinsic
boundary to the technological paradigm. It allows the
study of interactions between actors when examining a
given sector. In the boundaries of a technological trajec-
tory, it dissociates the involvement of upstream and
downstream ﬁrms from the technological paradigm in
itself and from the structure of the innovation chain. It
requires the speciﬁc management and decision-making
criteria applied by the ﬁrms to be listed. It justiﬁes the
study of the key links in the upstream and downstream
product-chains and, ﬁnally, it clariﬁes the application of
the research policies.
2.2.2. Gereffi: From the global commodity chain
to the global value chain
The origins of this approach date back to the work of
Hopkins and Wallerstein (1977) in Sociology of Develop-
ment (Bair, 2005). These authors study the territorial
expansion of capitalism. They disapprove of the main-
stream views of globalization and of continuous market
expansion, as well as the theory of world-systems pro-
moted by the French historian Fernand Braudel. They
deﬁne the ‘commodity chain’ starting from the down-
stream elements of the chain: from consumers to raw
materials, back to the worker and his food. The Marxist
reference remains highly present. They observe globaliza-
tion, its scale changes and mass production of ‘‘standard’’
goods (commodities). The social reproduction of work is at
the heart of the analysis. They study the way ‘commodity
chains’ structure and reproduce a world-system stratiﬁed
and organized into a hierarchy. We ﬁnd here the centre-
periphery analysis of unequal distribution of wealth (value
added) in the ‘commodity chain’.
Gerefﬁ and Korzeniewicz (1994) deﬁned a ‘Global
Commodity Chain’ as an ‘inter-organizational network’
linking households, ﬁrms and states together in a world
economy’. The central goal here is to determine where,
how and by whom the value is created and distributed
across the fili ere. They focus on national development,
local particularities and linkages, the strength of the
leading ﬁrms and their role in development. The question
is speciﬁcally meso-analytical and based on many casestudies of international networks. The purpose here is to
understand the role of those chains of goods in national
development, including by taking account of the impacts
on competitiveness, and in upgrading. Thus, we ﬁnd here
the classical question of fili ere analysis, but more in terms
of development issues and considered from an
international perspective. These issues were discussed in
detail in Raikes et al. (2000).
Therefore, we study here the input–output structures, the
technical itinerary, the governance structure, the control over
the various stages in the production process, the appropriation
of the value created and the power relationships across the
chain. Here, when compared to transaction costs (see below),
the network of inter-ﬁrms is not an organizational form:
neither a market nor a hierarchy, and the power in the chain is
not an outcome of ownership. Considerable improtance is
granted to the territorial and geographical dimensions, as well
as the socio-institutional context.
We classify this approach to the filieres in two sub-
categories. Authors distinguish between ‘buyer-driven chains’
(BDC), for those controlled by the downstream actors, and the
‘producer-driven chains’ (PDC), for those controlled by
the upstream actors. The ﬁrst include labor-intensive industries
(toys, clothing) driven by the leading retail ﬁrms through
outsourcing, with a signiﬁcant geographic dispersion of
production. The second are driven by multinational
ﬁrms, which are both ﬁnance and know-how intensive (auto-
mobile industry, electronics). Coordination is both internal,
through its subsidiaries and afﬁliates, and external. This
category demonstrates a lower geographic dispersion. These
works highlight the importance of dependency on standards
established by the major ﬁrms, as well as the high level of
heterogeneity of national and local production systems.
In the wine industry, internationalization was only partly
assessed within this framework. A ﬁrst reﬂection on the
globalization of the wine chain was introduced in one of our
previous studies (Montaigne et al., 2002). Later, Coelho and
Rastoin (2005) focused on the strategy of the ﬁrms and
ﬁnance-driven dynamics.
Together with the community of researchers studying
the production networks in global economies, Gerefﬁ
extended the analysis by adopting the complementary
concept of global value chain (GVC). His analysis
accords considerable importance to the governance struc-
tures which vary according to the characteristics of the
production process, the organization of the industry
(sophistication, technology), the existence or the lack of
standards, market reversals and the speed of adaptation.
To some extent, we can say that the concept of the global
value chain is an enrichment of the concept of the global
commodity chain through the addition of many case
studies and the essential contribution of the transaction
costs approach (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001; Sturgeon,
2001; Gerefﬁ et al., 2005).
This central role granted to the transaction costs
approach represents the third research stream that renews
the fili ere analysis.
E. Montaigne, A. Coelho / Wine Economics and Policy 1 (2012) 41–53442.2.3. The contribution of transaction costs theory
The main contributions of transaction costs theory to
economics since Ronald H. Coase, the Nobel Prize winner
in 1991, and Oliver E. Williamson are by now widely
recognized and in general use. They can be summarized as
follows: exchanges in markets or within ﬁrms produce
costs referred to as ‘transaction costs’. These costs inﬂu-
ence the organizational, contractual and strategic choices
in the short and long term. This theoretical approach raises
the question of the nature of the ﬁrm and its boundaries.
What is of interest to our analysis is the extent to which it
completes the set of methods used in the fili ere analysis.
The ﬁrst essential contribution involves ‘theorizing’ the
boundaries of the fili ere. We explained above how the
researcher could make arbitrary choices when deﬁning
the boundaries of each part of the system. Transaction
costs assume that production and transaction costs
together are minimized, which justiﬁes differences in
organizational forms, i.e., markets, contracts or integra-
tion. This leads us to examine the role of transaction costs
in the ‘form’ of fili ere. We studied the role of market
intermediaries in the wine industry which are generally
known as ‘countryside wine brokers’. We concluded that
they were match-makers and their business profession was
created to minimize transaction costs, considering that
wine is a product with variable quality and with geo-
graphic dispersion (Baritaux et al., 2005).
The second contribution is provided by what is known
as the ‘contracts theory’, which contributes to renewing the
perception of the contractual relationship in the only
controversial dimension of bargaining power in order to
share the value added as a function of the grape price level.
The creation of a contractual quasi-rent as a result of
speciﬁc investments provided by both parties creates a
more positive dimension as a result of the additional value
creation induced. The study of contractual relationships
between grape growers and winemakers in order to
manage quality is a true exempliﬁcation of this issue
(Montaigne et al., 2005, 2007).
The third contribution of this theoretical framework is
based on its positioning outside the neoclassical main-
stream approach, while maintaining the optimization
criteria of this last approach. By considering the assump-
tions of bounded rationality, uncertainty, opportunism
and asset speciﬁcity, transaction costs theory provides
explanations for speciﬁc contractual arrangements, with
self-interest conscious agents, and speciﬁc assets. The
choice to integrate grape production by wine merchants
or not is often explained in our surveys (Montaigne et al.,
2007) as a result of uncertainties in grape production,
derived from both weather and market conditions or the
need to control the upstream quality of the grapes, only
reachable through direct grape growing.
2.2.4. The analysis of value chains by managers
The concept of the value chain was developed by
Michael Porter in his landmark book published in 1980.The concept of the value chain has been used as a strategic
management tool for the planning of organizations over
the last few decades. The goal of this method of value
chain analysis consists of maximizing value creation while
ensuring cost minimization. It aims to develop a compe-
titive advantage for one organization. When applied to
agricultural filieres in developing countries, this method
aims to foster both export growth and rural development
(Asian Development Bank, n.d.).
The framework proposed by managers introduces a
more pragmatic and normative view. This approach does
not raise questions about the nature of the structure of the
filiere. It assumes that the structure of the filiere is already
established. It focuses on the determinants of the competi-
tiveness of the filiere, almost independently of the bargain-
ing power and of the resulting conﬂicts. It identiﬁes the
constraints imposed on producers relating to growth and
competitiveness, the limits to investments and therefore job
creation, the political and institutional factors and the
infrastructures impacting the market environment.
This approach is based on the central idea that the value
of the filiere is, in the end, determined by the consumer and
therefore the products must primarily be ‘pulled-out’ by
consumers and not ‘pushed-out’ by producers. We must
therefore eliminate activities which do not create value and,
in contrast, maintain or develop those which do create value.
Particular attention is paid to cost reduction in order to meet
customer demands when looking to reduce expenditure.
First, the method involves choosing a sector. It is then a
question of analyzing the market at national and interna-
tional levels, ‘drawing up a map’ of the value chain,
measuring its performance and analyzing deviations, while
identifying market and state failures. It therefore consists
of observing the tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade,
taxation, the state of infrastructures and services, prices,
legislative barriers and their application, administrative
barriers, the factors of market rigidity, the freezing of
prices and subsidies and ﬁnally an appraisal of the quality
standards.
In the wine sector, several research works have been
undertaken by professional bodies or public authorities in
order to better understand the competitiveness of the
filieres at the international level (Brugiere et al., 2006).
2.3. Conclusion
In this ﬁrst section we proposed an updated synthesis of
the theoretical tools that might be useful to the fili ere
analysis. The presentation of the fili ere almost always
appeared as a ‘description’ for which we did not have
enough theoretical references in order to provide a better
understanding of the way the fili ere analysis was con-
ducted. It is therefore important to retain here the tradi-
tional questions: the technical itinerary as an outcome of
the laws of nature, technical progress and the extent of
actors’ specialization; bargaining power within the filiere
and the share of value-added and ﬁnally, the systemic
3It might be pointed out that those organizations should be included
in the fili ere and a detailed explanation should be provided, but that
was not our choice. A ﬁrst issue concerns the deﬁnition of the borders
of the system that one plans to analyze. Therefore, the analysis
requires a ‘cross section’ of the sector. Where should the researcher
stop this ‘cross section’? This question remains open because it is
possible to add to our selection teaching and research activities,
technical institutes, transfers and even specialized state institutions.
We could possibly add laboratories, specialized lawyers and even
banks. This cross section raises the question of the choice of borders in
the system. Concerning professional organizations, we selected the
transaction costs approach. It focus on the organization contributing
to the deﬁnition of the rules and norms and therefore structuring the
institutional environment, more than the ﬁrms contributing to pro-
duction or service providers depending on the main fili ere or even
‘dedicated’ services taking charge of administrative tasks. Therefore,
this choice explains why we did not select those actors as speciﬁc
entities to the wine fili ere. The cluster approach enlarges this
perspective.
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system. The innovation filieres, together with product
filieres, inﬂuence competition dynamics in particular
through technology. The globalization of markets renewed
development economics and the internationalization of
filieres within the global commodity chains driven by the
upstream or downstream issues in those chains. The
transaction costs approach fostered the transition from
GCC towards the global value chain and it facilitated the
detailed analysis of new linkages and mechanisms within
the filieres. Some of those linkages include the intermedi-
ary professions such as wine brokers or the conditions for
controlling qualitative relationships between the segments
of the filiere by means of contracts.
The above discussion provides a large panel of ‘tools’
to ﬁne tune our knowledge about a large industrial
sector. This group of instruments guides academic
research and, used together, provides a more complete
and detailed representation of an industrial sector. The
choice of questions is as essential as the way in which the
research is conducted.
3. The actors in the wine chain
3.1. Grape growers
The production of grapes for winemaking is the basis of
the wine chain. Despite major technological changes, most
of the winemaking countries have extremely heterogeneous
farm holdings. Generally speaking, we identify four main
factors that explain the diversity in grape farms (Traversac
et al., 2006). (1) The ﬁrst is the degree of specialization,
which classiﬁes viticulture into two groups: dominant and
secondary. (2) The second concerns the structure of vine
farms, identifying two different groups: professional vine
farms and small commercial viticulture. The ﬁrst type
includes four different groups: viticulture with employees,
family viticulture, individual viticulture (the owner of the
farm) and viticulture as a complement (to other activities).
The second type is often qualiﬁed as small commercial
viticulture. These farms are quite small in size in order to
produce a sufﬁcient income for the grape grower and his
family. Off-farm income originates from multiple activity
or is provided by social transfers (unemployment, retire-
ment or semi-retirement, diversiﬁcation). (3) The third
factor is the degree of vertical integration of the different
functions in the wine chain. Indeed, the grape grower
may sell his grapes or choose to process the grapes
through a co-operative or on his own, selling it in
bulk or bottled, fully integrating all the stages of the
wine chain. (4) The fourth factor is the regional location.
Every region has its own institutions: in Europe,
the inter-professional bodies and the registered designa-
tion councils (syndicats, consorzi di tutela, consejos
reguladores), in the Americas the organization of clus-
ters. This registered designation plays an essential role in
constructing a collective reputation, building a productrange, and setting price levels.3 These dimensions, even
considered in different forms, may be found in all the
vineyards across the world.
These typologies vary according to the countries, the
statistical sources available and the choices and goals of
the researchers who develop these typologies. They com-
bine different criteria such as economic proﬁts (gross
standard margin or the unit of economic dimension),
economic feasibility, size, family and non-family workers
and off-farm revenues.
The criteria related to the economic dimension are
quite important from the standpoint of economic policy
because it provides a better understanding of the capacity
for resistance in small farms. These farms operate
essentially with a ‘reserve’ or labor registered in the
accounting. In the event of overproduction and low
prices, these labor-intensive farms make certain technical
choices to reduce input expenditure (e.g., cuttings from
hybrids in the minifundia of Romania) and do not pay for
ﬁxed assets (depreciation of assets). In these cases, only
variable costs, minimized as far as possible, are taken
into account (Villemin et al., 2011). A constant debate in
the Ministries of Agriculture and in the European
administration in Brussels concerns the opportunity to
include or not these categories within the social protec-
tion system. Likewise, in Latin America the debate on
minifundia and latifundia remains valid.
For many years in Europe, family viticulture has been
the basis of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and
the systems of ensuring revenues based on prices were
justiﬁed through ‘political’ backing for maintaining
incomes. In those regions characterized by specialized vine
farms, wine prices have increasingly been the key variable
determining revenue levels while other expenditures almost
always remain stable. This situation has also been based on
the role played by the co-operatives, discussed hereafter,
through the separation of grape-growing activities from
winemaking, according to the high level of investment
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signiﬁcant ‘patrimonial reserve’ and the nature of a
perennial plant, thereby explaining the inertia of signiﬁcant
changes.
Traditionally, one contrasts co-operatives and indepen-
dent winemakers, the latter deemed to produce the best
quality wines and adapt more quickly to grape varietal
evolutions. The broad diversity of the results within both
categories of wine producers, together with detailed mono-
graph studies, shows a greater diversiﬁcation among their
paths. However, it seems obvious that in the regions which
were among the ﬁrst to develop the registered designation
system and obtaining better prices for the wines, we ﬁnd a
greater number of estates, chaˆteaux and private cellars.
The differentiation of the products provides better returns
for this other type of productive and commercial organiza-
tion (AOC/PDO).
Outside Europe, the development of new vine farms
through the establishment of large-scale properties has
often adopted a fully ‘integrated’ structure. We ﬁnd here
some investment projects with ﬁnancing coming from
outside (non-wine) and ﬁnancial investors. The Tupungato
region in Argentina and the Central and East European
countries illustrates this situation.
The full diversity of viticulture and its regional eco-
nomic outcomes is summarized through a unique vari-
able, essential for the understanding of the sector: land
prices. Most of the land experts evaluate the land price
following the economic proﬁts of the two or three
previous years through a medium-term smoothing out.
Land value is related essentially to the quality level and to
the value level of the products on the market. Differences
come essentially from supply pressures. For example,
differences in land values may result from the hetero-
geneity of practices related to vine planting rights of some
of the European regions, or due restrictive choices and
relaxed behaviors from the collective organizations
(Montaigne et al., 2012).4 Crisis periods led to strong
falls of land prices in the countries without regulations:
50% in Australia over the last few years.5 The same
impact was produced with the implementation of the
grubbing-up vine scheme in Europe in the period ranging
from 2007 to 2012.3.2. Co-operatives
A co-operative is an enterprise created by farmers in
order to ensure a shared use of production materials,
packaging, bottling, warehousing and marketing, proces-
sing of agricultural products from farm holdings, the
supply of fertilizers and other raw materials. ‘One man,4In 2010, the price of land per hectare reached h 907,900 in Champagne,
h 225,000 in Napa, h 35,000 in Me´doc but h 1 650,000 in Paulliac, h
60,000 in the Spanish Basque country and h 31,500 in Rioja.
5WineAlley, 2009, L’Australie vers une sortie des marche´s de masse
(accessed 2009-07-28); http://www.winealley.com/dossier_50072_fr.htm.one voice’ is one of the founding principles of co-
operatives. Therefore, irrespective of the amount of grapes
or wine that members produce, all members have the same
voting power in assemblies. ‘New generation’ co-operatives
have introduced some variations to this principle. At the
tax level, co-operatives in France are an extension of farm
holdings and therefore do not disclose any proﬁts. In the
case of ﬁnancial proﬁts, co-operative members get a
‘discounted price’ proportional to the activity volume they
share with their co-operative.
Co-operatives play a major role in the wine chain. This
organizational form may control up to75% of the wine
volumes in some regions, such as Languedoc–Roussillon
(France), South Africa and Tunisia. In other countries
they are highly dominant, accounting for total wine
volumes ranging from 50% to 70%, as is the case in
Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal (Touzard et al., 2008).
Since the emerging of co-operatives at the end of the 19th
century, they have continuously evolved under the impact
of the technical, political and economic changes in the
institutional environment (Touzard et al., 2008). Beyond
local and national speciﬁcities, co-operatives as a whole
have followed a ‘life-cycle’ that we can divide into four
different phases: emergence, extension, specialization and
ﬁnally, restructuring.
The ﬁrst wine co-operatives emerged in the United
States (1867), in Germany (1868), in Switzerland, in Italy
(1872), and in Spain (1890). After the turn of the century,
new organizations emerged in France (Maraussan, 1901)
and in the rest of the world. The common ground for the
development of this ‘non-proﬁt’ form of organization was
the reaction to the economic crisis in the industry related
to the plethora of goods and to the fall in prices. Following
the 1907 crisis and the violent confrontations, the Langue-
doc region became the French reference to illustrate this
situation. The choice of collective groupings was a means
of obtaining economic advantages related to (1) improved
market power as a result of the enhancement of the size of
these enterprises, the possibilities related to stocks and the
management of the wine supply and the improvement of
wine quality; (2) the economies of scale resulting from the
use of technology in winemaking depend on the scale of
the equipment, the specialization of the winemaker and the
size of the facilities; (3) access to ﬁnancing for the harvest
and to investments. In addition to these economic motiva-
tions, co-operatives undertook various social projects
allowing small producers and their families to be main-
tained based on the humanist values of solidarity, educa-
tion and social progress.
Throughout the 20th century the number of co-
operatives increased in all countries. This does not imply
that they did not face drawbacks or failures. The strength
of the expansion varied according to the region, the type of
farm, the experience as co-operative members and the
reputation of the vineyards, and therefore the price level at
which the vines were sold. Indeed, in the regions beneﬁting
from a Designation of Origin system (AOC/PDO), a higher
7More precisely, co-operatives are non-proﬁt driven organizations. Co-
operatives have always been considered as an extension of farm holdings.
Therefore, proﬁt and loss accounts are distributed to co-operative
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the differentiation of quality and wines held in private
cellars. Nevertheless, the standard form of organization is
the small village co-operative producing bulk wines.
The legislative framework for co-operatives became more
structured and included both property rights and the form of
governance. The ﬂagship principle of ‘one man, one vote’
summarizes those principles. At the political level, the
signiﬁcant number of co-operative members justiﬁes state
support through tax exemptions and subsidies for invest-
ment. Services provided in co-operative form were created
for ﬁnancing (agricultural co-operative banking), mechan-
ization (co-operative suppliers of machinery), wine distilling,
and oenologist guidance (Institut Coope´ratif du Vin). This
organization facilitated a strong resistance to crisis but
sometimes also became a barrier to change in the case of
small vine farms. At the institutional level, co-operatives
created an association (Fe´de´ration) in order to ensure their
political and lobbying strength.6
This raises problems relating to collective action: the
choice and level of investments, controls and frauds, the
costs and ‘complexity’ of collective decision-making. But
the development of table wines and of a certain type of
standardization of the product limited these difﬁculties.
During the entire period, the economic advantages became
more signiﬁcant than the difﬁculties of strategic
governance.
‘The most widely recognized processes of the expansion of
the co-operatives follows the path of the dissemination of an
organizational innovation impacted by national external
forces, the conditions of the ‘starting ground’ and the
building of a scientiﬁc path through a chain of investments
in relational, institutional and cognitive, equipment achieved
by groups of grape growers that later become members of
the co-operative’ (Touzard et al., 2008).
This form of co-operative would lock itself onto mass
production and corporatist governance. During the 1960s–
1980s, the co-operative movement reached maturity with a
signiﬁcant part of winemaking resulting from the co-
operatives. Likewise, co-operatives also developed in the
regions producing quality wines. In Eastern European
countries, the transition towards a market economy dis-
rupted the organization of agricultural co-operatives in the
communist economies. In Chile, co-operatives disappeared
after the coup d’E´tat and the new privatization policy.
Elsewhere, mass production developed further and was
backed, and protected, by the action of professional unions
(syndicats).
At the same time, the context of the market was
inexorably transformed: the daily consumption model of
table wine progressively disappeared in all traditional wine
countries. This included not only Europe, but also Argen-
tina, Chile and South Africa. A new consumption model
emerged characterized by occasional consumption, more6In new and emerging world regions we also ﬁnd federations of wine
co-operatives (example, Fecovinho in Brazil and Fecovita in Argentina).celebration-rooted, focused on superior quality with differ-
entiated and more expensive wines.
Starting in the 1980s, the industry adapted and restruc-
tured to include new grape varieties and better quality in
the different price-brackets. The number of co-operatives
decreased sharply through mergers, absorption or failure.
Depending on the country or the region considered, this
reduction might (or might not) be due to the reduction of
the supply by vine-growers by uprooting vines and so
reducing the increased ﬁxed costs. Otherwise it might also
be the result of a strategic merger or a privatization. Wine
product ranges began to diversify. Some monopolies like
those of KWV in South Africa disappeared. The inter-
nationalization of the wine market became more intense,
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) moved from a
policy of backing the markets through distilling to ﬁnan-
cial aid, the promotion of products and support for rural
and local development. New consumer requirements were
also taken into account: health, pesticides, ecology, heri-
tage and ethical issues.
In this context, coordination problems neglected in the
past re-emerged: the trade-off concerning investments, the
soft connections between grape growing and cellars to
manage quality, the assumption of strategic risks at
market-level and product-level and the costs related to
collective decision-making. Economies of scale do not
operate as the main driver and are not uniform. Economies
of scope became an important driver. Many wine co-
operatives established common-law wine subsidiaries (non
co-operative) whose main goal was to market the wine
from those same co-operatives. We identify here the signs
of a converging trend in line with the business practices of
proﬁt-driven ﬁrms.7
Today, specialists in wine co-operatives distinguish ﬁve
different typical forms of co-operatives (Touzard et al.,
2008):1.me
org
alth
redThe small village co-operative producing basic wine.
This type of co-operative is now an older form which is
gradually disappearing.2. The small co-operative producing quality wines and
achieving good performances. It uses distribution networks
that recognize efforts made concerning quality. The circuits
may include direct sales, wine stores or specialized exports.
This type of co-operative looks to achieve a balance
between the values of the grapes paid to co-operative
members and the development of the enterprise.3. The agro-industrial co-operative dealing with high
volumes of wine. This entity manages a great diversitymbers or allocated to the reserve. Accounting practices in those
anizations are therefore different from those in proﬁt-driven ﬁrms,
ough rational managers are also proﬁt maximizers. The means of
istributing earnings in co-operatives has also become a strategic issue.
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trols its costs and may build a full range of products
through brand-building processes.4. The specialized co-operative within a second- or third-
tier group of co-operatives. It provides all the produc-
tion to a producer organization or to a second-tier
group of co-operatives that develops an offensive
commercial strategy like a competitive wine merchant.5. The quasi-integrated co-operative. This form of organi-
zation has close ties with wine merchants. The wine-
making is based on a contractual arrangement with
wine merchants. The contract aims to produce quality
wines under the supervision of the wine merchant.
Contracts are renewed tacitly. The design of contracts
may vary according to the levels of quality required.
The durability of the contract depends on market trends
(Montaigne et al., 2007).
This atypical form of organization is an outcome of a
historical tradition. Following more than a century of the
co-operative movement, the phenomena of convergence
with traditional forms of corporate capitalism and the
persistence of an original organization with different
values became a reality (see, for example, Chaddad and
Cook, 2004; Cook and Chaddad, 2004).3.3. Wine brokers
Wine brokers are unknown actors but remain essential.
To our knowledge there are no other studies outside
France about this business profession. Thus, we introduce
here some of the results of the research undertaken in
France. Wine brokers operate in the upstream part of the
wine chain, on behalf of wholesalers (bulk wine, tanks, not
packaged) accounting for almost 60% of the ﬁrst wine
market commercialization in France. We estimate that
these wines contribute up to 60% (volume) of trade both
for table wines and for wines with geographic indication
(vin de pays). It accounts for approximately 80% for the
trade in AOC wines (Baritaux et al., 2005). We focus our
analysis on ‘countryside wine brokers’,8 whose mission can
be summarized in three main points: (1) to provide every
stakeholder with the conditions of the transaction, (2) to
provide information about the market situation and (3) to
advise and try to reconcile their interests, which may be
divergent.
What characterizes them as intermediaries of whole-
salers is the fact that they do not buy the goods (non-
trading intermediaries) but are instead paid on a commis-
sion basis (which generally corresponds to a ﬁxed amount
of money per unit of the product or alternatively to a
percentage of the amount of the transaction). With respect
to other intermediaries, they do not execute anyCourtiers de campagne, in the French literature.commercial transaction and therefore retain some level of
independence associated with their speciﬁc competencies.
Wine brokers fulﬁll three main functions: they collect and
transmit information, help negotiations and they ensure the
follow-up of the transactions. The collection and transmis-
sion of information is by far the most important function.
Therefore, information concerning the environment of the
transaction (prices, stock levels y) is often publicly avail-
able, at little cost, to all stakeholders in the market
(mercuriales). In contrast, the speciﬁc information concern-
ing the characteristics of the products (desired or proposed),
the volumes and prices, the practices, including samples, is in
the private domain.
Searching for information on the product characteris-
tics, the supplier and the buyer, they involve grape growers
and downstream operators in the market. It is an essential
function. It helps achieve complex transactions in line with
market needs and plays a signiﬁcant role in the adaptation
of the fili ere. Furthermore, this function reduces global
transaction costs in order to optimize the ‘supply–demand’
ﬁt, allowing these stakeholders to meet easily in the
countryside.
In negotiations, wine brokers use standard contracts and
assume a part of the administrative work. They nevertheless
remain responsible for every commercial agreement. They
inform all stakeholders about their reciprocal needs and
contribute their knowledge. They then act as a mediator who
is required to complete a wine sale, in particular to reach an
agreement over prices. They are sometimes criticized during
wine crises (lower prices). Their independent status remains
essential because their connections with stakeholders, and
therefore their reputation, remain their main strength.
Wine brokers reduce the risk of transactions through the
control exerted over the contracting parts and their engage-
ments; they are at the forefront of the discussions whenever
difﬁculties arise. In the event of conﬂicts (deterioration of
wine quality, maintaining the delay for wine removal y),
their reputation is at stake if they should go to court. The
very few situations when wine brokers use courts to solve
conﬂicts in the wine chain conﬁrm and reinforce the image
of efﬁciency of this type of coordination.
Wine brokers also play a role in the long term and in
speciﬁc relationships. They adapt to evolution. In Cham-
pagne, transactions are based on grapes and the wine
brokers are involved in more than 80% of grape purchases.
In this region contracts established with wine merchants
for delivering grapes may last several years. Long-term
wine contracts or grape-based contracts develop in other
regions according to the model characterizing New World
wine producers. The concentration of the wine chain is
another factor that threatens wine brokers, but the latter
remain through the evolution of the activity of meeting
suppliers and buyers in negotiations. They provide these
relationships with a degree of ﬂexibility by maintaining a
communication activity and possibly a bargaining acti-
vity in an evolutionary and complex environment. Their
contribution as information providers is a reaction to
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attentive to the transaction conditions related to the on-
going contracts.
At the theoretical level, as expressed in transaction costs
theory, wine brokers appear as a hybrid form, identical to
the (grape or wine) contract, involving neither integration
nor the market and minimizing transaction costs. The
unsuccessful attempts to create a market place or an
auction market and the fact that the creation of stores,
catalogues, etcy are not adapted to the nature of the bulk
wine market (atomization of operators, geographic disper-
sion, fragility, diversity, transportation and warehousing,
qualitative uncertainty) conﬁrm the effectiveness of a
market based on bilateral transactions ‘‘intermediated’’
through wine brokers. ‘Not very well known but essen-
tial’—this expression summarizes the role of wine brokers
in the French wine chain.
3.4. Wine merchants
In France, the deﬁnition of a ‘wine merchant’ is admin-
istrative: ﬁrms must acknowledge this status and its legal
constraints to be authorized to buy and sell wine. Wine
merchants operate in a different manner from wine
brokers, as the ﬁrst beneﬁt from the transfer of the
property right (wine assets). The structure of wine mer-
chants’ linkages in the wine chain remains complex. Wine
merchants are less concentrated than the leading ﬁrms in
the other food industries. However, they remain character-
ized by a great diversity as a result of the historical
evolution.9 Today, a wine estate becomes a wine merchant
whenever it purchases and resells the wine of its neighbors
if its own production is too scarce to satisfy customers. It is
difﬁcult to monitor the industry at the level of small and
medium enterprises (Montaigne et al., 1997).
The precise deﬁnition of this segment of the filiere
therefore requires that we consider the total size of the
company (number of employees, turnover), the share of
wines produced with own vines (vineyard surfaces) and the
(bulk) wines purchased, the type of wine treated (aging,
aging methods, designation of origin) and the distribution
networks (direct sales, hotels–restaurants–coffees, major
retailers, exports). A particular form of wine merchant, not
so widespread in France except for Champagne and ‘vins
de sable’ (Languedoc), is the ‘winery’, which is common
across the New World producing countries. The winery
operates differently from traditional wine merchants as it
mainly purchases the harvest and not the wine; the wines
are processed in the facilities of the winery owner. Here,9For example, in France, a co-operative that bottles its own wine and
makes direct sales to consumers or/and sells directly to commercial
marketing channels is not considered a wine merchant. However, if a
co-operative purchases wine from other co-operatives or from wine
merchants or, possibly, resells the wine, it must apply for the legal status
of ‘wine merchant’. Most often, all the co-operatives or producing
organizations developing this commercial activity have established wine
merchant subsidiaries or adopted other legal statuses.the winery purchases the raw materials (grapes) from
third-parties and drives the quality levels through contracts
established with grape growers. (Montaigne et al., 2007).
In France, over the last forty years, the wine merchant
sector has evolved signiﬁcantly. Up until 1960s–1970s, it
concerned mainly table wines. This beverage for everyday
consumption should reach consumers at a reasonable
price. This is why the classical model linked a wine
merchant ensuring both shipping and importing in the
Southern European regions with wine merchants bottling
close to the site of consumption, i.e., mainly the major
cities (Paris, Lyon, Marseille y). Bulk transportation
through a wagon-tank minimized transportation costs.
Gradually, the changing consumption model – moving
from table wines to quality wines – and the continuous
development of major food retailers modiﬁed this logistical
organization. The wine sold in advance in self-service
facilities had to be packaged and backed by brands. The
logistical organization of major food retailers supported
through the development of logistical platforms for dis-
tribution optimized transportation and justiﬁed the packa-
ging far from sales points. A great number of traditional
wine merchants disappeared and bulk wine exports remain
a controversial issue, generating social costs but environ-
mental and economic beneﬁts (disappearing jobs in the
producing regions but lower transportation costs and CO2
emissions).
Surviving companies purchased bottling lines and orga-
nized themselves to meet the requirements of this new
distribution form. Producer organizations joined these
companies, most often structured as second-tier co-opera-
tives built up following the purchase of a failed wine
merchant. In the consumption regions, beverage distribu-
tors also develop this activity through the stabilization of
wine sourcing in the production regions. For that purpose,
these operators more often than not undertake several
mergers and acquisitions or sign speciﬁc contracts. A
typical example of a wine merchant following this type
of strategy became the main French wine exporter. In the
registered designation regions, wine merchants integrating
winemaking activities adapted their product lines and
included varietal wines produced elsewhere. Consequently,
concentration increased among wine merchants.
At a more strategic level, we noticed an increasing trend to
better control or even integrate several functions of the wine
chain. The upstream level of the wine chain (groups of co-
operatives, wine merchants, distributors) integrated down-
stream activities (packaging, marketing, distribution); the
downstream level (wine merchants bottling, wine merchants
integrating winemaking) looked to a better integration of the
sourcing activities. Additionally, several small and medium
enterprises emerged with strong connections to a major
vine farm.
At the level of the major ﬁrms, the recent history of the
world wine industry has been inﬂuenced by the develop-
ment and the internationalization of multinational wine
ﬁrms. At the beginning of the 1980s, the major ﬁrms of the
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tors in the wine industry. The restructuring implemented
by the major wine companies changed the landscape and
the hierarchy of the world leaders. The annual number of
mergers and acquisitions increased from 50 in 1998 to a
maximum of 350 in 2007. After this period, it recorded a
sharp decrease following the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007. The
slowing down was also related to several uncertainties that
impacted the international wine market (trends in prices,
wine lakes in some Southern Hemisphere countries,
increase in production, energy and environmental costs).
In the United States, mergers and acquisitions developed
during this period of time. The exchange parity rate trans-
formed American wineries into cheap targets for international
investors. A great number of American wine ﬁrms are
reaching the end of the ﬁrst generation of owners and are
now faced with many uncertainties (lack of successors, many
founders wish to leave the industry).These conditions create a
dynamic and attractive market for mergers and acquisitions.
Changes observed in the world wine market result from the
strategic moves of major ﬁrms, mostly headquartered in New
World producing countries. We can therefore identify four
main motivations structuring the strategic behavior of the
major wine ﬁrms: (1) to secure grape sourcing; (2) the search
for economies of scale and scope; (3) consolidation of
notoriety; and (4) the control of the distribution networks.
The strategies of multinational ﬁrms alter the balance in
the world wine chain through ﬁnancialization, concentra-
tion and the emergence of new decision centers. We notice
an increasing penetration of ﬁnancial investors in the
ownership of wine ﬁrms (banks, insurance companies,
institutional investors, specialized wine funds, etc.). The
ﬁnancialization of corporate governance structures leads
these ﬁrms to search for better risk-return trade-offs and
an improvement in the listing on the stock exchanges (for
public listed companies). New corporate operators emerge
in the wine chain – particularly specialized wine funds –
adopting new industrial (increasing focus on the core
business of major wine multinationals) and ﬁnancial (share
buybacks for the public listed wine companies) strategies.
The phenomenon of ﬁnancialization leads the companies
to move from an obligation of ‘means’ to an obligation of
‘proﬁts’ and to focus excessively on short-term issues. The
dissemination of the Anglo-American corporate govern-
ance model and the growing internationalization of the
portfolio of wine investors foster convergence among the
different international corporate governance models
(Japan, Southern Europe).
The increasing concentration of ﬁrms in the world wine
industry is underway. However, the trend has slowed down
considerably over the last few years as a consequence of
the international ﬁnancial crisis. The top 40 world wine
companies today account for approximately 40% of the
value of the world wine markets. This level of concentra-
tion is far lower than in other categories of alcoholic (beer,
distilled spirits) or non-alcoholic (soft drinks, bottled
water) beverages.In New World wine countries, the concentration of the
industry is more marked. This means that the leading ﬁrms
in those countries are able to achieve more signiﬁcant
economies of scale. It also means that these ﬁrms are less
dependent on upstream and downstream operators. There-
fore, ceteris paribus, pressure on the ﬁnancial margins of
leading New World ﬁrms is not so dependent on upstream
elements (mainly inputs, caps, cork stoppers, bottlers,
barrels, etc.) and downstream stakeholders (beverage whole-
salers, major food retailers, hotels, restaurants, cafe´sy)
The increasing concentration of ﬁrms in European
Union countries is also endorsed by the common market
organization (CMO) for wine. Wine co-operatives have
been particularly impacted by mergers and acquisitions,
mostly in the Southern European regions of Languedoc–
Roussillon (France), Castilla La Mancha (Spain), and
Southern Italy (Puglia, Sicily).
The international wine industry is currently structured
as an oligopoly with ‘fringes’, i.e., a competition arena
where a limited number of ﬁrms account for a signiﬁcant
proportion of wine sales. The ‘head’ of the oligopoly is
accompanied by a large number of small and medium-
sized ﬁrms (Coelho and Rastoin, 2004). At the head of the
oligopoly we ﬁnd today the leading Chinese ﬁrms, publicly
listed on the stock exchange: Yantai Changyu (the main
shareholder is Ilva Saronno, Italy) and Dynasty Fine Wine
Group (the main shareholder is Re´my Cointreau, France).
It includes also, the Argentinean leader, the Pen˜aﬂor
Group (100% controlled by the Bemberg family). Some
Indian and Brazilian leaders may eventually emerge in the
longer term. Therefore, the competition arena in the wine
industry remains quite open.
3.5. Clusters
Established research in economics deﬁnes ‘clusters’ as
groupings, generally structured according to employment
basins, involving companies in the same sector. Clusters
are a source of positive externalities, generally known as
network externalities. This concept refers to the landmark
work of Alfred Marshall about ‘industrial districts’ at the
beginning of the 20th century. The most quoted example
concerns the ‘Third Italy’ described in the works of
Becattini (1992). This approach was the basis for many
studies in economic geography. Michael Porter also con-
tributed to the development of this approach through its
application to the Californian wine cluster (Porter, 1980,
1990). Competition and cooperation among ﬁrms inside
and outside clusters ensure survival and the development
of an industry. Clusters are therefore the basis for the
competiveness of an industry.
Migone and Howlett, (2010) surveyed the studies of
wine clusters around the world. They raised the question of
the ‘cluster’, a concept strongly embedded in a geographic
location, and the ‘network’ concept, which is more rooted
in knowledge ﬂows. According to these authors, what
makes a cluster successful is the ability to adapt to
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(1) the heterogeneity of internal elements inﬂuenced by the
diversity of ﬁrms and the existence of an offer of technical
and banking services, the presence of government and
research institutions as well as universities; (2) the establish-
ment of linkages, both commercial and non-commercial,
within the geographic location; (3) the development of
innovation at the regional level, but not only at that level;
and (4) the differentiation of wine clusters according to the
scarcity of terroirs, climatic particularities and the political
and economic legislation as well as the importance of
tradition in terms of product quality.
Clusters are therefore collective projects whose goal is to
foster the regional competitiveness of a given industry.
Within the cluster, collective goals become more important
than individual interests. The main elements of the cluster
concept includes trust, leading ﬁrms, intermediaries, asso-
ciations (consorzi, wine institutes, etc.) and the ability of
the cluster to solve problems related to collective action.
Governments provide support through activities related to
research (R&D) and legislation. Differentiation of the
leading ﬁrms operates through the capacity of those ﬁrms
to innovate and to demonstrate the ‘best practices’ to small
and medium enterprises, as well as their ability to interact
with the public administration. The leading ﬁrms make a
combined effort to improve long-term market shares in
export markets. The way Australian leading wine ﬁrms
penetrated the United Kingdom market during the 1990s,
acting as ‘ice-breakers’ and opening the market to small
and medium Australian wine producers, provides a good
‘case study’ for understanding the importance of leader-
ship and cooperation in a cluster.
At the world wine industry level, we ﬁnd clusters in
many regions of New World wine producing countries: in
Australia (Barossa Valley, Riverinay), Chile, Argentina,
South Africa and southern Brazil (Serra Gau´cha). The
heterogeneity of research methods used on clusters and to
assess externalities in clusters is a challenge for researchers
(Migone and Howlett, 2010). In Europe, wine clusters
are less developed, although we ﬁnd some examples in
regions such as Champagne, Rioja and Tuscany. The weak
presence of clusters in Europe is explained due to the
absence of the key elements deﬁning the cluster: trust, the
capacity of the members in a cluster to solve the problems
related to collective action, opportunist behavior among
intermediaries, the lack of true leading ﬁrms in terms of
innovation and market-orientation, etc.
In line with these developments, competitiveness in a
cluster is related to attractiveness and its capacity to bring
new investors to the cluster location. The example of the
deliberate strategy undertaken by the Chilean wine cluster
illustrates this type of dynamics. Over the years, foreign
investors, starting with Miguel Torres from Spain in the
late 1970s, from the ﬁve continents invested in the Chilean
wine cluster. Those investors brought important resources
such as ﬁnancing, knowledge and experience in competi-
tion on export markets. Clusters evolve through differentphases in the long run where learning economies and
shared knowledge renew clusters and create the conditions
necessary to achieve sustainable competitive advantages.
In this respect, the 2007 agenda for the New Zealand wine
cluster (i.e., New Zealand—Pure Discovery) focusing on
sustainable development and increasing regionalization
(Sauvignon Blanc in Marlborough, Pinot Noir in Central
Otago y) is in line with the cluster life-cycle dynamics.
Clusters are also an essential asset as a collective means of
resisting economic crises. Generally speaking, and in
contrast to Southern European countries, New World
wine producers follow this type of strategy.
The widely available literature with different case studies
raises concerns about the issue of cluster governance. In
this respect, McDermott (2007) highlights the role played
by public and private institutions in the case of the
Mendoza wine cluster). Uncertainty remains about the
sources of information and the origins of innovation. For
example, vines coming from sanitary and clonal selection
used in the expansion of Chilean vineyards were provided
through thirty years of French wine viticultural research.
The causal nexus between the success of the wine chain and
the cluster effects is hard to demonstrate. Some of the
studies highlight different types of cluster: global, analy-
tical, and mixed. The presence of those key ‘elements’
would appear to be a ‘facilitator’ of success, and the
necessary adaptation of generic knowledge to the local
context becomes obvious. It is not strange that wine
clusters provide a better explanation for the expansion of
new vineyards than for traditional vineyards where the
dynamics of enterprises and institutions at the local level is
older, more complex and more difﬁcult to assess in terms
of industrial success.
4. Conclusion
Looking back to the research questions raised by the
filiere analysis allowed us to justify and understand the
perspectives associated with the different approaches and
descriptions highlighted as well as to the activities of the
stakeholders in the upstream levels of the wine chain.
The knowledge of a fili ere as complex as the wine filiere
at the world level is the result of a stream of research
across time in different countries. The theoretical
approaches that we synthesized here constitute a guide to
understanding the way of ‘thinking’ this fili ere, i.e., to
analyze and to offer the main actors, including political
and professional decision-makers, a means of clarifying the
strategic choices.
This introduction of the upstream section of the wine
filiere is not exhaustive but provides the main stylized-facts
summarizing the operations of the filiere in different
countries, according to the differences reported but also
the possible convergences and stabilities.
Technological dynamics are a central issue in assessing
competitiveness in an apparently traditional and conservative
ﬁeld: the quality of plant material, clone selection and sanitary
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ods used to ﬁght parasites; mechanization, management of
water stress and all the oenology improvements through the
ﬁne tuning of wine tanks and temperature controls and the
new methods of stabilization and conditioning. The impor-
tance of these technologies is considered within the study of
innovation filieres and of the strategic approaches related to
clusters.
Trade-offs in the wine chain and the ﬁght for sharing the
value-added did not disappear within the fili eres. Also,
newly published work grounded in the transaction costs
approach demonstrates the importance of driving the
quality-levels through contracting and the creation of
‘quasi-rents’ among the actors, at the origin of an addi-
tional source of wealth to be shared.
New actors are constantly emerging: new grape growers,
new wine merchants, new intermediaries, new strategic
groups, but also new countries ‘emerging’ in the ﬁeld of
wine such as China, Brazil, India, Mexico and even
Ethiopia. Each time, their positioning in the filiere and
the rationale behind their development deserve a detailed
and precise analysis.
After summarizing the organization of the supply side in
the wine industry, the essential issues to retain here include:
the great diversity of operators and the persistence of this
diversity in the long run. From this perspective, the evolu-
tionist theory represents quite well, at the industry level, the
persistence of diversity creation (principle of mutation) and
the persistence of the mechanisms reducing diversity (prin-
ciple of selection and adaptation) (Metcalfe, 1995).
Over the last thirty years, a large extension of the
European vineyards was grubbed up, the qualitative
reconversion was pursued, economic transition in Eastern
European countries and in the southern hemisphere
became a reality, new markets developed and two eco-
nomic crisis impacted the wine industry at the world level,
one as a result of supply-side effects (2004) and the other
one driven by the demand conditions (2008). In this
landscape, characterized by strong changes, no alternative
development model emerged. Likewise, no stakeholder at
the upstream-level of the wine chain appeared as the
dominant force. We observe a large number of new entries
and exits in all countries and at all levels of the wine fili ere.
Finally, beyond the description of the operators, it seems
that the most important issue is to identify the transforma-
tion mechanisms that emerge in that part of the filiere.References
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